South Africa’s municipal elections: The ANC heads into the vote weakened but remains the kingmaker.

About

Léonard Mbulle-Nziege is a Senior Consultant in Economic Intelligence at Concerto, based in Cape Town. He advises businesses on political risk, due diligence, and electoral analysis in Africa. Contact Léonard at lnm@concerto-pr.com to learn more.

QUICK INSIGHTS

• A drop in ANC votes could see the party lose control of most metros for the first time since the return to democracy, reflecting a decline in support that has occurred in every election since 2004.  
• Despite the projected fall in ANC electoral support, opposition parties are unlikely to secure outright majorities in battleground metros. This dynamic could position the ANC as kingmaker in selecting mayors in these localities.
• Since 2016, municipal contests have served as a barometer of broader political sentiment, with national issues such as illegal immigration and unemployment shaping the current local campaign discourse.
• The election will influence internal ANC dynamics ahead of its 2027 elective conference, with the forum’s outcome expected to determine whether the party will maintain the Government of National Unity (GNU).

Persistent poor service delivery in ANC-run municipalities, the rise of the populist MKP, and friction with historical alliance partners are expected to erode the ANC’s vote nationwide. The 2024 general election saw the ANC register 40.1%, its lowest share since the founding democratic contest in 1994, amid concern that the party will experience a further decline during the municipal election. While municipal-level mismanagement and corruption – an issue acknowledged by President Cyril Ramaphosa – have fuelled anger towards the ANC, the rise of the MKP – which had a 14.5% score in 2024 – will also hamper the ruling party’s election prospects. Additionally, the ANC’s fallout with coalition partners, the South African Communist Party – which will present candidates independently – and the powerful Confederation of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) has also reduced its mobilisation capacity. 

The battle for Johannesburg

The potential loss of Johannesburg symbolises the ANC’s broader electoral struggles, which have accelerated over the past decade. The country’s largest metro has suffered chronic leadership instability, with ten mayors since 2016, including five ANC members. The incumbent Dada Morero has borne the bulk of criticism for successive mayors’ failure to address crumbling electricity, water and road infrastructure. Criticism peaked in the lead-up to the November 2025 G20 Summit in Johannesburg, prompting the national government to intervene and undertake emergency maintenance. The metro faces financial challenges, having incurred ZAR 72 billion (USD 4.3 billion) in unpaid debt, while the 18-party city administration reportedly faces a ZAR 2.1 billion (USD 128 million) budget shortfall for the current fiscal year. Despite Johannesburg contributing an estimated 16% of GDP, the metro’s underperformance has made the DA-controlled Cape Town an increasingly attractive investment destination.

The DA is positioned to benefit from voter frustration over the ANC’s poor service delivery record. The party is seeking to resume leadership in Johannesburg after running the city from 2016 to 2018 and 2021 to 2022. It is well placed to perform strongly and secure the largest share of votes, according to several opinion polls. The country’s second-largest party has campaigned aggressively on its ability to tackle legacy service delivery issues and restore financial stability. It is also banking on the experience of its candidate and former Cape Town mayor Helen Zille to attract voters. 

Even if the DA emerges with the highest score, opposition vote splitting is likely to prevent the party from securing a majority in Johannesburg. The party will likely struggle to form a coalition if it does not register at least 40% of the vote. South Africa uses a proportional representation system, rather than a first-past-the-post formula. This means that councillors will elect the party to lead the metro, which will subsequently appoint its designated candidate as mayor. Despite the DA’s dynamic campaign, anti-ANC voter sentiment is more likely to benefit the MKP – which could potentially register at least 10% of votes – alongside Action SA and PA. The latter two have campaigned on anti-immigration platforms. If the DA fails to capitalise on dwindling ANC support in Johannesburg, it would underscore the party’s persistent struggle to win over black voters. Party leader Geordin Hill-Lewis has acknowledged that it suffers from a “trust deficit” with this demographic.

Because the DA clashes with other opposition parties, an ANC-backed coalition may be its only realistic path to run Johannesburg, even if it wins the most votes. The DA has indicated that it will not form a coalition with the opposition Economic Freedom Fighters and MKP due to ideological differences. Meanwhile, it is unlikely to work with ActionSA, which is made up of disgruntled former DA members. In this regard, the most feasible option would be a DA-led coalition that includes Government of National Unity members, including the ANC, IFP, PA, and Rise Mzansi. 

However, an Action SA-led coalition with ANC backing could prove a plausible alternative. This possibility stems from apprehension among ANC Gauteng Province members regarding the ANC working with the DA in the GNU. These dynamics mean the country’s two largest parties do not partner at the municipal level in the country’s economic capital, as well as in the ANC-led provincial coalition government. An Action SA-led metro with ANC support would mirror the current leadership structure in Tshwane and allow the ruling party to maintain a position of influence.

The DA is in control, but under pressure in Cape Town

Meanwhile, the DA could lose its majority in Cape Town amid growing discontent regarding the party’s inability to address crime and allegations that it allocates disproportionate resources to affluent suburbs. The DA has run Cape Town since 2006 and has held an absolute majority since 2011, with a string of clean municipal audits and a strong service-delivery record compared with other metros. This has contributed to the city having the lowest unemployment rate among metros at 21.9% and attracting significant investment. Nevertheless, the party has been accused of prioritising service delivery in well-to-do neighbourhoods and failing to address Apartheid-era spatial planning, as well as gang violence and drug trafficking, claims denied by current mayor, Geordin Hill-Lewis, who has served since 2021. The PA and Action SA have tapped into these longstanding grievances by appealing to the city’s coloured and working-class communities, which have traditionally voted for the DA. Despite these frustrations, the DA is expected to win the largest share of the vote, with a majority or a score that would enable it to comfortably form a coalition. 

eThekwini and the MKP’s potential triumph

The MKP is expected to win in eThekwini, which includes Durban, the third-largest city, despite leadership instability and party head Jacob Zuma’s absence from the campaign trail due to ill health. The MKP is likely to build on its maiden 2024 election performance, in which it earned 45.3% of the vote in the KwaZulu-Natal Province, which has emerged as its electoral stronghold. Although the party was established as an anti-Ramaphosa vehicle, it has mobilised Zulu voters, as well as the black constituents who would have traditionally opted for the EFF and IFP. While MKP will emerge as the largest party in eThekwini, it will need a coalition with smaller parties to run the metro if it does not secure a majority. In parallel, an anti-MKP alliance could emerge that would include a DA- or IFP-led metro, with ANC backing. This would replicate the strategy these parties used in 2024, which allowed the IFP to form a provincial government at the expense of the MKP.

The ANC will remain a prominent political actor despite its declining support

While it is unclear who will win the Tshwane, Ekurheleni and Nelson Mandela Bay metros, the ANC will be in a position to influence who runs these localities even if the DA secures the largest share of the vote. Moreover, the ANC’s expected victories in Buffalo City (East London) and Manguang (Bloemfontein) reflect its multi-provincial support base, despite its widespread criticism. Against this backdrop, while the ANC is unlikely to regain majority support countrywide in its current configuration, the fragmentation of the political party landscape and growing embrace of coalition politics will enable it to play a leading decision-making role going forward. This is coupled with opposition parties’ inability to sustainably grow support. Despite increasing its share of seats in the National Assembly from 16.6% in 2014 to 21.5% in 2024, the DA’s number of votes declined from 4 million to 3.5 million during this period. This reflects a pattern among opposition parties that stagnate after peaking in support, with the EFF and IFP showing this trend. 

The election result will directly influence the ANC succession race ahead of the party’s 2027 elective conference, with ANC President Cyril Ramaphosa due to step down in December 2027. Avoiding defeat in Johannesburg and ensuring it controls the majority of metros would give Ramaphosa leverage in choosing his successor. This would also put ANC Secretary General and presidential hopeful Fikile Mbalula in an advantageous position heading into the conference, having led the party’s election campaign. A Mbalula-led ANC would also make it more likely the party would maintain the GNU. However, a poor performance would improve the position of other potential successors, including Deputy President Paul Mashatile, National Assembly Speaker Thoko Didiza, and Electricity Minister Kgosientsho Ramokgopa, as they have less electoral exposure. It is unclear whether the GNU would continue under the party leadership of these individuals.

Political disillusionment has become increasingly palpable

Amid declining participation rates, voter apathy is expected to be a key factor, as citizens have increasingly lost trust in mainstream political parties and turn to anti-state organisations to voice their grievances. Despite a record 29 million registered voters, turnout has declined steadily to 58.6% in 2024 from 66% in 2019. Similarly, turnout in the 2021 municipal contest was 45.8%, down from 58% in 2016. A stagnant economy, with growth averaging around 1% over the last decade and unemployment at 33.6%, along with underwhelming government performance, has contributed to voter disengagement. Against this challenging economic backdrop, grassroots organisations such as the anti-immigrant March and March movement have gained nationwide support and prominence. Such groups have emerged as channels for South Africans to voice their distrust in the political system.